Canada and China at 40 by Frolic, Bernie Michael
ASIA COLLOQUIA PAPERS
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Prof. B. (Bernie) Michael FROLIC
Professor Emeritus
Dept. of PoliƟ cal Science
York University, Toronto
Canada and China at 40
— With a Response by Professor Ruth Hayhoe
Vol. 1 No. 1 // September 2011
1
www.yorku.ca/ycar
YORK CENTRE FOR ASIAN RESEARCH
In the 2010 Asia Lecture, Professor Frolic shared unique insights into 
the evoluƟ on of Canada-China relaƟ ons focusing on the complex 
negoƟ aƟ ons and diplomaƟ c coup by which Canada established 
diplomaƟ c Ɵ es with the People’s Republic in autumn 1970. One 
of Canada’s foremost China scholars, Frolic fi rst visited China as 
a graduate student in 1965 and went on to become a Canadian 
diplomaƟ c representaƟ ve to the Communist state in the mid-1970s. 
Using fi rst-hand experience, expert knowledge, and rare interview 
material, Frolic provided glimpses of how Canada’s diplomaƟ c Ɵ es 
with China came about despite Cold War tensions. As he explained 
with candour and simplicity, although the decision to formalize 
Ɵ es with China brought a chill to Canada’s own relaƟ ons with the 
United States for a Ɵ me, it marked a coming of age for Canadian 
foreign policy: what became known as the Canadian SoluƟ on to 
the diplomaƟ c quandary of the “One China” policy was eventually 
adopted by other countries. Frolic places the evoluƟ on of formal 
Canada-China relaƟ ons in the context of milestones, from Norman 
Bethune to the controversial Canadian grain sales to China during its 
Great Famine, from the “missionary kids” who became Canada’s fi rst 
crop of diplomats to China to the deŌ  handling of the “One China” 
issue that brought Canada to diplomaƟ c centre stage. Prominent 
Canadian China scholar, Prof. Ruth Hayhoe, off ered an equally 
insighƞ ul response.
In 1965, some 45 years ago, I went to China. I was a gradu-
ate student then in Moscow, doing research on Soviet com-
munism. The Sino-Soviet split had escalated: every day the 
Russian and Chinese students in my dormitory at Moscow 
University were heatedly arguing with each other about 
socialism and revoluƟ on. AŌ er many months of living in the 
Soviet Union, I was looking to escape from the drab greyness 
of Soviet socialism. Could China off er the promise of a fresher 
brand of Marxism?
 From the eleventh storey window of my room at the 
University I could see the big, stolid Chinese Embassy squaƫ  ng 
on the horizon. So I went there one winter day to apply for a 
visa. We spoke in Russian. “Why do you want to go to China?” 
“Because I need to see for myself what is happening in your 
country.” Or to be frank, China was a mysterious, exciƟ ng, 
exoƟ c place to this young Canadian. Never mind the ideologi-
cal squabbling. “Don’t you know that our two countries do 
not recognize each other? We don’t have diplomaƟ c relaƟ ons. 
Hardly any Canadians are allowed to go to China. Come back 
in two weeks and we will tell you if our government will grant 
you a visa.”
 Few Canadians had visited China aŌ er Mao and the 
Communists took power in 1949. We had no formal relaƟ ons, 
and China was not a Canadian priority. Canada’s main roots 
were in Europe and North America, not in the Pacifi c. Before 
World War II, the Pacifi c, then generally referred to as the Far 
East, was the terrain of a handful of Canadian missionaries 
and traders. We briefl y permiƩ ed immigraƟ on to Canada from 
China and Japan, in the late nineteenth century, but in a fi nal 
burst of racism aŌ er World War I banned any more “orientals” 
from entering Canada.
 As Canada acquired more presence in internaƟ onal 
aff airs in the twenƟ eth century, we established small trade 
offi  ces in Tokyo, Shanghai and Hong Kong. In World War II 
China, then ruled by the KMT (Kuomintang), was our ally, one 
of the Big Five (United States, Soviet Union, France, Britain, 
China) fi ghƟ ng the Japanese. We supported what was then the 
legiƟ mate government of China (Chiang Kai-shek) even as the 
KMT and the Communists were embroiled in a civil war that 
led to the defeat of the KMT. When the KMT government fell 
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in 1949 and fl ed to Taiwan, the KMT Ambassador remained in 
OƩ awa, an accident of history and a poliƟ cal embarrassment 
to Canada. Canada never sent an ambassador to Taiwan. 
 We never had a diplomaƟ c mission in Taiwan, unlike 
the Americans. When the Communists were about to assume 
power in 1949 the Canadian government made plans to recog-
nize the new China. We acquired a building and had an offi  cer 
waiƟ ng in place. But recogniƟ on never happened. The Cold 
War intervened; the Korean War broke out and we shied away 
from establishing relaƟ ons with a country with which we were 
in ideological and armed confl ict. In the 1950s and into the 
1960s Canada tried several Ɵ mes to engage China. Each Ɵ me, 
in 1955, 1958, and 1963, the iniƟ aƟ ve failed. ConvenƟ onal 
wisdom is that American opposiƟ on to the recogniƟ on of the 
PRC (People’s Republic of China) was the decisive factor. 
 In 1955 and again in 1958, Eisenhower allegedly 
threatened economic retaliaƟ on and American withdrawal 
from the U.N. if Canada went ahead. In 1963-64, Kennedy and 
then Johnson were becoming enmeshed in Vietnam. BeƩ er 
relaƟ ons with China—a three-Ɵ me enemy (the Chinese civil 
war in the 1940s, the Korean War in the 1950s, and fi nally 
Vietnam)—were not seen as an American policy opƟ on at 
that parƟ cular moment. In fact, while American opposiƟ on 
weighed heavily in the mind of Canadians, we should not place 
full blame the Americans for our hesitaƟ on. China wasn’t that 
important to us. Canadian domesƟ c poliƟ cs played a key role. 
Quebec, which was signifi cantly anƟ -communist in the 1950s, 
smarƟ ng from harsh Chinese treatment of Catholic nuns and 
missionaries, was opposed to recogniƟ on. No one among the 
dominant Liberal Party wanted to alienate Quebec voters who 
were staunchly Liberal; Canadian public opinion did not sup-
port improved relaƟ ons with China unƟ l well into the 1960s.
 Trudeau later speaks of “sleeping next to the American 
elephant—whose every twitch and grunt—aff ects Canada.”  
The elephant metaphor has stuck with us over the years, 
certainly well into the late 1980s when we changed course and 
embraced free trade with the United States. Back in the 1950s 
and certainly in the 1960s, however, Canadian anƟ -American-
ism rode high, in our criƟ cism of the United States for its Viet-
nam policy, for American strategic policies, for its policies that 
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compromised Canadian sovereignty (placing nuclear warheads 
in Canadian missile sites), for its economic and cultural policies 
that would pose a threat to our exports and naƟ onal idenƟ ty, 
and, ironically, for mostly ignoring us.
 By the mid 1960s when I fi rst went to China, it was 
becoming fashionable for Canadians to view our China policy 
as a statement of independence from America. American 
China policy was mired in Cold War poliƟ cs, at a Ɵ me when the 
Sino-Soviet split was beginning to reshape the world order. In 
1964 two important events occurred. China exploded a nucle-
ar device and it established diplomaƟ c relaƟ ons with France. 
Suddenly the Americans would have to begin to rethink their 
hard policy of “isolaƟ on and containment” of China and accept 
the fact that France, a major Western country, had opted for a 
one-China policy, abandoning its relaƟ onship with Taiwan.
 For 20 years the Americans had supported the KMT 
and Chiang Kai-shek, fi rst as the government of China and then 
as the ruling party in Taiwan. Chiang and his wife were cel-
ebrated by America as great heroes, defenders of democracy 
and Free China, and solid opponents of communism. For those 
twenty years the Americans had made Taiwan’s survival a 
centre-piece of U.S. policy in Asia, and the Americans were not 
ready to sacrifi ce its ally, nor admit defeat.
 Canada had only a lukewarm commitment to Taiwan. 
Aside from trade we had minimal Ɵ es—no offi  cial representa-
Ɵ on on the island, no pro-KMT lobby in Canada, unlike the 
American CommiƩ ee of One Million that was embedded in the 
U.S. Congress. For many Canadians, myself included, Taiwan 
was an American issue requiring American and PRC soluƟ ons. 
We should remember that in the 1950s and 1960s, Taiwan was 
sƟ ll a nasty authoritarian state with a small group of mainland-
er exiles suppressing the local Taiwanese majority populaƟ on. 
Only in 1987 did it allow open poliƟ cal opposiƟ on. Only in the 
1980s did its economy develop to the extent that it ranked in 
the word’s top dozen in terms of GDP (gross domesƟ c 
product).
 Why am I dwelling on Taiwan at this point? Because 
Canadian recogniƟ on of China in 1970 was hailed by us as an 
act of poliƟ cal emancipaƟ on from the Americans, and it was 
our decision to end formal relaƟ ons with Taiwan that made 
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this possible. As Yu Zhan, Ambassador to Canada in the 1970s 
said to me, “Establishing diplomaƟ c relaƟ ons was all about 
Taiwan. We were paƟ ent with Canada. We were ready to wait 
100 years or more to get agreement that there is only one 
China. Canada was fl exible; we knew that the Americans were 
not. They were militarily Ɵ ed to Taiwan by treaty and by their 
history.”
 Our diff ering commitments to Taiwan are one part of 
the story, but there is more to be said. While the American 
offi  cial posiƟ on into the mid-1960s was that China is “the en-
emy” and that communism was a threat to American hegemo-
ny, Canadians appeared to be more willing to look for ways to 
engage with China, not being saddled with the U.S.  responsi-
bility to lead the fi ght against communism. We fancied our role 
as “helpful fi xer” and “mediator,” supported by a past history 
with China that was essenƟ ally benign, if not pracƟ cally invis-
ible. As Yu Zhan remarked, “You were not an imperialist power. 
You never occupied China. Never set up treaty ports. You 
built hospitals and schools for us—your Dr. Norman Bethune 
was celebrated by Chairman Mao for his selfl ess devoƟ on to 
China.”
 In 1965, when in China, I felt as a Canadian that we 
were on the cusp of engagement with China. In 1960, we had 
begun to sell China large quanƟ Ɵ es of wheat, the fi rst country 
to do so in the midst of China’s Great Famine. Alvin Hamilton, 
then Minister in the Diefenbaker government, recalls how, 
“Two Chinese gentlemen arrived in Montréal with suitcases 
full of money to buy wheat. I directed them to Winnipeg, the 
offi  ces of the Canadian Wheat Board. Then I had to persuade 
Cabinet to approve the deal... It was for over 100 million 
dollars.” In 1959 the Globe and Mail became the fi rst North 
American newspaper to have an offi  ce in the PRC. The report-
age was thin—our journalists were kept at arms length by 
their minders. AŌ er less than a year the fi rst one, Frederick 
Nossal, was expelled. Nevertheless, we had a Canadian pres-
ence inside China. The New York Times did not and was forced 
to reprint its China coverage from the Globe and Mail.
 And we had Norman Bethune. On the train to Beijing, 
when Chinese passengers heard I was Canadian they replied: 
“Bai Qiu En” (Bethune). Not knowing any Chinese then aside 
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from “Jia Na Da” (Canada), it took me two days to realize his 
importance to China. Chairman Mao had made this Canadian, 
warts and all, into a Chinese hero—“even though he was a 
foreigner, he helped China.” During the Cultural RevoluƟ on, 
Mao’s arƟ cle on Bethune was read by hundreds of millions 
of Chinese. In the midst of Cold War ideological compeƟ Ɵ on 
between East and West, a small spot had been reserved for 
Canada. 
 In a changing world in the mid-1960s, the groundwork 
was being laid for China’s “coming out” into the world and for 
Canada’s special role. Behind the scenes, Canada’s elite foreign 
policy establishment, the Department of External Aff airs, had 
several Ɵ mes produced China policy reviews and summaries of 
possible Canadian scenarios, either to establish trade offi  ces 
in China and Canada or to support China’s admission to the 
United NaƟ ons. The DEA contained a group of senior offi  cials 
who were sympatheƟ c to engaging China. The so-called “mish 
kids”—children of former missionary families in China—were 
a key part of this group: Chester Ronning, Ralph Collins, John 
Small, and Arthur Menzies. The laƩ er three, born in China and 
Mandarin speaking, later served as the fi rst three Canadian 
ambassadors to China from 1971 to 1980.
 We had the professional diplomaƟ c experƟ se, the mish 
kids, Norman Bethune, the wheat sales and a China beginning 
to look for new allies in the widening Sino-Soviet split. Also, 
Canadian public opinion had turned. A majority was now in 
favour of recogniƟ on. The Quiet RevoluƟ on in Quebec, plus 
France’s recogniƟ on of the PRC in 1964 had brought Quebec 
more in line with the rest of Canada. What was lacking was a 
catalyst to move us to the next level—direct negoƟ aƟ ons with 
the PRC.
 The arrival of Pierre Elliot Trudeau as new leader of the 
Liberal Party in 1968 was that catalyst. While his predecessor, 
Lester Pearson, had vacillated on China (“BeƩ er to have peace 
with Washington than relaƟ ons with Peking”), Trudeau, as 
early as 1950, had advocated engagement with China. He had 
visited China in 1949 for several weeks, observing the Commu-
nist takeover. In 1960 he and four others travelled to China for 
three weeks, and he and Jacques Hebert produced the book 
Deux Innocents en Chine Rouge where they wrote: 
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 Our conduct is doubly irraƟ onal: in poliƟ cs we refuse to 
 recognize the existence of those who rule a quarter—
 soon to be a third—of the human race; and we don’t 
 deign to sit with them in the councils of the naƟ ons; in 
 economics we hesitate to increase our trading 
 relaƟ ons with the most formidable reservoir of con- 
 sumpƟ on and producƟ on that ever existed.
In 1966, Trudeau chafed in frustraƟ on siƫ  ng in New York City 
as a member of the Canadian delegaƟ on that was supporƟ ng 
the admission of China to the United NaƟ ons in the face of 
strong American opposiƟ on. Canadian eff orts were defeated 
by the Americans, and Trudeau later said in a conversaƟ on 
with me, “I saw then that recogniƟ on was the only way—and 
enough Canadians were ready to support that posiƟ on.” In 
1968 Trudeau as new leader of the Liberal Party announced 
that, 
 Canada had tended to overlook the reality that Canada 
 is a Pacifi c country—we have long advocated a posi-
 Ɵ ve approach to mainland China and its inclusion 
 in the world community—we have an economic 
 interest in trade with China and a poliƟ cal interest in 
 prevenƟ ng tension between China and its neighbours 
 (and) especially between China and the United States.
     
 Our aim will be to recognize the PRC government as 
 soon as possible and to enable that government to 
 occupy the seat of China in the UN, taking into account 
 there is a separate government in Taiwan.  
What exactly were Canada’s goals as it sought to engage 
China? Was trade the main factor? We already had a thriving 
wheat trade and the Canadian Wheat Board was nervous that 
the poliƟ cal negoƟ aƟ ons might upset these arrangements. 
Trudeau in conversaƟ on said that trade was not his main goal; 
rather it was to end China’s isolaƟ on and “bring it into the 
world community.” Some saw the Canadian iniƟ aƟ ve as an act 
of independence against American tutelage. We no longer felt 
longer constrained by American policy and threats of retali-
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aƟ on. For others it was a chance to produce a foreign policy 
achievement that would once again impress the world. As 
Mitchell Sharp, the Canadian Foreign Minister later said, “It is 
not oŌ en that Canada leads the world. Our recogniƟ on led a 
procession of some thirty other countries which very shortly 
thereaŌ er, followed our example—employing what came to be 
known as the Canadian Formula.”
 Were the Chinese ready to negoƟ ate? It was 1968 and 
the Cultural RevoluƟ on was in full swing. China seemed to be 
focussed inward on its poliƟ cal struggles. Soviet troops were 
massing on China’s borders. The Ministry of Foreign Aff airs, 
which was responsible for conducƟ ng foreign relaƟ ons, was 
under Red Guard aƩ ack. Zhou Enlai himself was vulnerable. 
China had withdrawn all its ambassadors from their foreign 
posƟ ngs, save one. So was China likely to reply? And if not, 
would Canada “lose face?” In fact, there was an eight-month 
delay before China offi  cially signalled its willingness to meet. 
Trudeau said later, “Some people thought we were taking 
a risk. What would happen if the Chinese just ignored us? I 
counselled paƟ ence—Ɵ me was on our side.”
 The story of the Stockholm negoƟ aƟ ons, which lasted 
20 months and ended successfully, is a long one—too long for 
today’s talk. Perhaps it will be the subject of another lecture 
later this year. Today I can only menƟ on some of the highlights, 
the main issues, based on the extensive DEA fi les (now depos-
ited in York Archives and in the NaƟ onal Archives in OƩ awa), 
as well as interviews with the fi ve key members of the Cana-
dian negoƟ aƟ ng team and the head of the Chinese negoƟ aƟ ng 
team in Beijing. 
 What could we expect from the Chinese negoƟ ators? 
China in 1968 was wracked with violence and killing. It had 
violated diplomaƟ c protocol, endangering the safety of for-
eign diplomats and residents. When I was in China in 1965, 
the Canadian government asked me to report to the BriƟ sh 
Embassy. Britain then represented our interests in China. I was 
treated to a fi ne meal by the charge d’aff aires in a room fi lled 
with the most beauƟ ful Chinese porcelains, bronzes, and silks. 
Two years later, Red Guards stormed the BriƟ sh compound, 
destroying or looƟ ng what was inside, burning the building to 
the ground. The Globe and Mail correspondent, David Oancia, 
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recalled being outside the BriƟ sh Embassy at the Ɵ me. 
 For almost 45 minutes they pummelled the car and 
 shouted anƟ -Soviet and anƟ -imperialist slogans at us. 
 Then a new group arrived and with clubs and bars they 
 began to pound the car. They smashed the windshield, 
 the rear window, bashed in the roof and dented the 
 luggage compartment and engine covers…. Then they 
 began to spit at us.
 
 Would this type of behaviour—ideological confronta-
Ɵ on and anƟ -foreignism—infect the negoƟ aƟ ons? The Ameri-
cans and Chinese had been holding talks in Warsaw since the 
mid 1950s to resolve Korean War issues. AŌ er over 130 meet-
ings the Warsaw talks had produced sterile outcomes, each 
side reading prepared statements and holding to fi xed ideo-
logical posiƟ ons. Was this a scenario-in-waiƟ ng for the Canadi-
ans? In the subsequent meeƟ ngs in Stockholm, however, much 
to our surprise, the Chinese side fully observed the norms 
and pracƟ ces of convenƟ onal diplomacy. Chairman Mao’s 
name was only menƟ oned once during the enƟ re 20 months. 
The Chinese side, according to the chief Canadian negoƟ ator, 
“conducted itself in full accordance with standard internaƟ onal 
negoƟ aƟ ng procedure.”
 The Canadians expected the Chinese to hold back, not 
to reveal their posiƟ on unƟ l the Canadians had spoken. From 
what we knew about Chinese negoƟ aƟ ng pracƟ ce at the Ɵ me, 
we had this noƟ on of Chinese inscrutability overlaid with Mao-
ist ideology. To our surprise the Chinese took the iniƟ aƟ ve by 
immediately presenƟ ng its three “constant negoƟ aƟ ng prin-
ciples”:
 1. A government seeking relaƟ ons with China must 
     recognize the Central People’s Government as the 
     sole and lawful government of the Chinese people;
 2. A government which wishes to have relaƟ ons with 
     China must recognize that Taiwan is an inalienable 
     part of Chinese territory and, in accordance with this 
     principle, must sever all kinds of relaƟ onships with 
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     the “Chiang Kai-shek gang;”
 3. A government seeking relaƟ ons with China must give 
     support to the restoraƟ on of the righƞ ul place and 
     legiƟ mate rights in the United NaƟ ons of the PRC, 
     and no longer give any backing to so-called repre-
     sentaƟ ves of Chiang Kai-shek in any organ of this 
     internaƟ onal body.
 
 They set the agenda, and Canada, which wanted fi rst to 
deal with “pracƟ caliƟ es” (trade agreements, consular maƩ ers, 
claims seƩ lements, protecƟ on of foreign naƟ onals, etc.) had to 
abandon that strategy and confront the only real issue: wheth-
er we were ready to derecognize Taiwan and agree that it was 
part of the PRC. For the remainder of the negoƟ aƟ ons Taiwan 
was always the focus. The rest was shadow play. ResoluƟ on 
of “pracƟ cal” issues had to wait unƟ l aŌ er recogniƟ on, to be 
seƩ led in the period up to and including Trudeau’s visit three 
years later in October 1973.
 Yao Guang, chief of the MFA negoƟ aƟ ng team, said 
later in conversaƟ on, “We proceeded cauƟ ously with Canada 
at the beginning. We had to be sure that Canada was acƟ ng 
on its own and not as a surrogate for the Americans. By the 
summer of 1969, your Foreign Minister, Mr. Sharp, had made it 
clear in a speech in the Canadian Parliament that there could 
be some movement on the Taiwan issue.”
 What about the American reacƟ on to our intenƟ on to 
establish diplomaƟ c relaƟ ons with China? While offi  cially the 
American posiƟ on was to conƟ nue to have nothing to do with 
China, in fact, by the later 1960s, the mood in America was 
changing. In view of the widening split between China and the 
Soviet Union, some felt it was Ɵ me for America to take ad-
vantage of the opportunity to play the “China Card.” In 1967, 
the arch anƟ -communist, Richard Nixon, published an arƟ cle 
in Foreign Aff airs suggesƟ ng it was Ɵ me to review U.S. China 
policy. In the spring of 1968 aŌ er the Tet Off ensive, it was ap-
parent that the Americans and Chinese would not be confront-
ing each other militarily in Vietnam. The policy of “isolaƟ on 
and containment” had shiŌ ed to “containment” only, in the 
minds of informed Americans, if not quite in offi  cial policy.
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 The Canadian iniƟ aƟ ve provoked the inevitable Ameri-
can angry reacƟ ons. The columnist Joseph Alsop complained 
that Canada “was crawling on its belly” to China. Dean Rusk, 
the ulƟ mate Cold War hawk, had constantly been reminding 
the Department that Canada must not sacrifi ce Taiwan. The 
Canadian Deputy Minister, Ed Ritchie, told his U.S. interlocu-
tors that, “We received 28 thousand leƩ ers concerning baby 
seals but less than 500 on China. It just isn’t a controversial 
issue for Canada.” As the talks proceeded, we kept the Ameri-
cans and a dozen other countries informed of their progress. 
The American offi  cials if not the pro-Taiwan, anƟ -“Red China” 
American media and other similar consƟ tuencies, backed off  in 
their formal criƟ cism. They were watching us carefully, how-
ever, to see how we would deal with Taiwan.
 It was no problem for the Canadians to agree that the 
PRC was the legal government of China. It was in full control of 
the mainland territory. The Chinese side had tried to subsƟ tute 
“the Chinese people” for “China,” but the Canadians were not 
fooled and that aƩ empt failed. We agreed to support China’s 
admission to the United NaƟ ons. We had sought this earlier 
and been rebuff ed by the Americans. Now China’s admis-
sion to the U.N. was just a maƩ er of Ɵ me. But how to resolve 
the Taiwan issue, since Trudeau had stated that Canada had 
to “take into account that there is a separate government in 
Taiwan”? While we refused to agree that Taiwan was “an in-
alienable part” of China (“We don’t ask China to agree that the 
ArcƟ c is a part of Canada”), we did fi nally “derecognize” the 
Taiwan government. The key language was that we “neither 
challenge nor endorse” China’s claim, but we do “take note” of 
that claim. “Take note” was the ice-breaker. It took almost 15 
months to fi nd this phrase, and at least four Canadians in-
volved in the negoƟ aƟ ons later took (modest) personal credit 
for its discovery.
 In the House of Commons in the summer of 1970, Mr. 
Sharp was asked if we would be withdrawing recogniƟ on from 
Taiwan:
    
 MR. SHARP: Yes, Mr. Speaker. I have made it quite clear 
 on a number of occasions that we have a one-China 
 policy now. We will have a one-China policy in the 
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 future.
 MR. LAMBERT (Edmonton West): You used to have a 
 two-China policy.
    
 MR. PAUL YEWCHUK (Athabasca): Does this mean that 
 Canada will be asking the Taiwan Ambassador to with-
 draw from Canada and has he been informed of this 
 clearly?
    
 MR. SHARP: Since we have a one-China policy we will 
 recognize one government of China and will not recog- 
 nize two.
By the fall of 1970 the two sides had reached agreement on 
the following statement:
 The Chinese Government reaffi  rms that Taiwan is an 
 inalienable part of the territory of the PRC. The 
 Canadian Government takes note of this posiƟ on of the 
 Chinese Government.
      
 The Canadian Government recognizes the Government 
 of the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal 
 government of China.
The October 13 announcement of the establishment of diplo-
maƟ c relaƟ ons was eclipsed in Canada by the War Measures 
Act implemented on the very same day. In the anƟ -climax 
following the end of the China negoƟ aƟ ons, the Taiwanese 
Ambassador was given a farewell lunch and quietly leŌ  the 
country. The Canadian Government moved swiŌ ly to send a 
team to Beijing to open the new mission. Ralph Collins, who 
had supervised the negoƟ aƟ ons, was appointed the fi rst 
Canadian Ambassador, and he quickly began to brush up on 
his nearly forgoƩ en Chinese. The Chinese side appointed a 
senior offi  cial, Huang Hua, to be Ambassador in OƩ awa. When 
the Chinese team arrived in OƩ awa to take over the Chinese 
Embassy premises, they discovered that the building had been 
sold by the Taiwanese a year earlier. IniƟ ally, both sides had to 
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start their missions in high rise apartment buildings, waiƟ ng to 
move into proper premises.
 In 1990, I wrote, “For Canada these negoƟ aƟ ons were 
a substanƟ al diplomaƟ c coup. The government had pursued a 
diffi  cult policy without managing to alienate Canada’s Ameri-
can neighbour, even though the American administraƟ on was 
offi  cially opposed. Canada had occupied the centre stage of 
world diplomacy for almost two years, showing off  a newly 
independent foreign policy, excellent diplomaƟ c skills, and the 
potenƟ al to be more than just a middle power—recogniƟ on 
was good for Canada and for Trudeau, the catalyst. At the 
Ɵ me, it stood out as a Canadian success story and deserves to 
be recorded in history in those terms.”
 Today, in retrospect, I might be a bit less eff usive in my 
praise of what we accomplished in 1970. Were we “out negoƟ -
ated” by the Chinese in our desire to make a deal? We gave up 
Taiwan, and the Chinese controlled the agenda for the talks. 
Could we have held out for more? The Americans later on did 
not have to sacrifi ce Taiwan, and in any case, the Canadian 
achievement was immediately blunted by a parade of other 
countries that established relaƟ ons with China aŌ er 1970 us-
ing the Canadian “one-China” formula. While Canada thought 
it was stealing a march on the Americans, the laƩ er launched 
their own “secret” iniƟ aƟ ve that would lead to Kissinger’s visit 
to Beijing in July 1971 and Nixon’s the following year. We had 
a brief moment in the sun, but then it was over, and we were 
only one of many foreign peƟ Ɵ oners at the court of Chinese 
Marxism.
At the Ɵ me, Canadian enthusiasm for what we had done was 
substanƟ al. This was reinforced by Trudeau’s visit in 1973 
when “pracƟ caliƟ es” were seƩ led and the two countries 
talked of a special relaƟ onship based on the conƟ nuing wheat 
sales, Norman Bethune, and Trudeau. When Trudeau met 
Zhou Enlai in Beijing, Zhou said that China owed Canada a debt 
of graƟ tude: 
 Canada was the fi rst country that granted us recogni-
 Ɵ on in 1970. It pushed a series of Western European 
 countries into taking a similar step. Your support of 
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 China in voƟ ng for our admission to the United NaƟ ons 
 in 1971 also brought similar results. You sold us wheat 
 when others would not.
Trudeau observed that 13 years earlier, in 1960, “I sat in this 
Great Hall of the People thinking that some day we would 
recognize this great naƟ on. I saw at a distance and with admi-
raƟ on the leaders of China—for me it is a great pleasure now 
to be together with so many of you.”
Zhou pointed out that he never signed bilateral trade agree-
ments, but since Trudeau had requested one he would sign. 
Zhou commented that because of Canada’s large wheat sales 
to China the PRC had developed a big trade defi cit with Cana-
da. We were not buying enough texƟ les from China. Zhou said 
this was China’s fault, not Canada’s: 
  
 We have to learn to work harder to sell you our goods. 
 We need to improve the quality of our exports and sell  
 at lower prices to win markets abroad. For example, we 
 need to learn how to compete with Taiwan’s texƟ le 
 exports.
 Not exactly following in Trudeau’s footsteps, I was sent 
to Beijing in 1974 to serve as First Secretary in our Embassy. It 
was a diffi  cult Ɵ me. The Cultural RevoluƟ on dominated daily 
life, and Zhou Enlai was under aƩ ack. Foreigners were Ɵ ghtly 
controlled. Our movements were restricted, and we were 
always being watched. I later wrote that our life in Beijing was 
like “cicadas living in a golden cage.” China was struggling to 
deal with its internal poliƟ cal demons and had liƩ le Ɵ me to 
open up to Canadians. SƟ ll, now we had over 20 Canadian 
exchange students in Beijing universiƟ es, acquiring language 
skills and China experƟ se. Many of this group later on made 
their mark as top China scholars, diplomats, and in other 
China-related professions.
 Most of my Ɵ me was spent negoƟ aƟ ng exchanges in 
culture, educaƟ on, medicine, science and technology, and 
sport. The care and feeding of these countless delegaƟ ons 
meant repeated trips back and forth from airports and the ar-
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ranging of formal banquets. Sport quickly became a headache, 
however. Montréal was the site for the 1976 Olympics, and the 
PRC wanted to make sure Taiwan—then calling itself the Re-
public of China (ROC) —would not parƟ cipate in the Olympics 
as “China.” I was regularly summoned by the All-China Sports 
FederaƟ on to be given a lecture reminding Canada that it had 
to adhere to our “one-China” policy and prevent Taiwan from 
coming to Montréal. Taiwan refused to give up the name ROC. 
The maƩ er eventually wound up on the desk of Prime Minis-
ter Trudeau, who did not yield to the American pressure to let 
Taiwan aƩ end. It was an awkward, unpopular decision, even 
though it reinforced our “one-China” policy. As it turned out, 
Taiwan refused to come, and the PRC was not ready to send a 
team. In 1984 both China and Taiwan parƟ cipated in the Los 
Angeles Olympics, with Taiwan called “China—Taipei.”
 In 1976 both Zhou and Mao died. An era was drawing 
to a close. Deng Xiaoping, who had joined Trudeau during his 
visit, announced that China would “open up” and that Chinese 
should be encouraged to xia hai—jump into the sea of markets 
and foreigners. By the mid 1980s a new China was emerging, 
one that had given up class struggle, had abandoned collecƟ v-
ized agriculture, was acƟ vely soliciƟ ng foreign investment and 
technology, and promoƟ ng entrepreneurship and free market 
principles. 
 Foreigners remembering the China of the 1970s at fi rst 
were wary of this sudden turn in direcƟ on. While Deng spoke 
for a new, less ideological kind of China (“It does not maƩ er if 
the cat is black or white as long as it catches mice.”) his op-
ponents within the Party resisted these changes. The struggle 
between reformers and these “hardliners” would persist 
throughout the 1980s, lending a measure of uncertainty to 
the long-term stability of the post-Mao reforms. Could China 
succeed in so abruptly changing course? Could it be trusted to 
take on a responsible role in convenƟ onal internaƟ onal insƟ -
tuƟ ons? The split between China and the Soviet Union had 
produced an emerging mulƟ polar world. The Cold War was 
winding down and China was searching for a place for itself in 
this changing world order.
 For Canadian business this heralded new trading op-
portuniƟ es. For academics and those engaged in people-to-
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people links, it was opening doors that had been basically shut 
since 1949. Thus, I was invited to give a series of lectures in 
1982 at Beijing University (Beida), a campus where I had been 
denied access for a large part of the 1970s. Now one could 
pass though the gates and talk directly with Chinese scholars, 
exchanging ideas with them, even have Beida publish what 
I had said. For those waiƟ ng in the wings for communism to 
“humanize” itself, if not actually to “democraƟ ze,” this modest 
embrace with capitalism and the outside world was a fi rst step 
in the inevitable “peaceful evoluƟ on” of Chinese communism 
to a more open poliƟ cal system.
 The Canadian government hoped to expand the bilat-
eral relaƟ onship to take advantage of these changes. The main 
target was trade, whose growth had not quite measured up to 
expectaƟ ons. It was diffi  cult to crack the China market. Canada 
now faced an imposing array of compeƟ tors. China moved 
cauƟ ously as it embraced foreign trade. Canadian companies 
found it much easier to look south to US markets than west-
wards to China. When Brian Mulroney and the ConservaƟ ves 
took power in 1984 they focussed on trade expansion and on 
developing a strategy designed to maximize opportuniƟ es for 
Canadian business in China through high-level visits, conces-
sional fi nancing, development assistance, regular govern-
ment-to-government poliƟ cal and economic consultaƟ ons, 
and people-to-people links. Mulroney had visited China as a 
private ciƟ zen in 1979, and the contrast for him, seven years 
later, was palpable: 
  
 I was struck by the tremendous changes in the last six 
 or seven years, tremendous progress that we can see 
 visibly on the streets. There is a greater sense of well 
 being, shared by the Chinese populaƟ on…. As Chair- 
 man Deng said the other day, the Chinese are trying to 
 be realisƟ c. They have an enormous problem, unique 
 in the world, in terms of inherent diffi  culƟ es that arise 
 because of [the size] of the populaƟ on itself.
 China policy under the ConservaƟ ves was one of con-
Ɵ nuity rather than change. The excepƟ on was human rights. 
The Party contained within its ranks an anƟ -communist group 
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that supported Taiwanese autonomy, was suspicious of China 
and, unlike the Liberals, publicly criƟ cized Chinese human 
rights pracƟ ces. When Mulroney met with Zhao Ziyang in 
1986, he openly criƟ cized China for its human rights pracƟ ces: 
“My farewell meeƟ ng with Premier Zhao was enƟ rely devoted 
to human rights—even though I did recognize the tradiƟ onal 
Chinese posiƟ on that this was an internal maƩ er, I didn’t raise 
it in a spirit of hosƟ lity. I raised it as the kind of subject that 
can be discussed between friends…”
 Nearing the end of the decade the bilateral relaƟ onship 
seemed solid. It was sƟ ll possible to talk of a “special relaƟ on-
ship,” although many other countries now also had their own 
“special” relaƟ onships with China. Our links had expanded—at 
the people-to-people level, in the fi eld of culture, educaƟ on 
and development assistance. The laƩ er, the CIDA (Canadian 
InternaƟ onal Development Agency) China programme set up 
in 1982, focussed on human resources, and we were training 
large numbers of Chinese in agriculture, management, forestry 
and other areas. With our self-proclaimed mission to “bring 
China into the community of naƟ ons” we had helped China 
gain membership in the World Bank and the IMF (InternaƟ onal 
Monetary Fund), and were assisƟ ng China’s entry into the 
GATT (the General Agreement on Tariff s and Trade). The fl ow 
of high-level ministerial visits was at a peak.
 Then it came crashing down with the events of June 4, 
1989 in Tiananmen Square. The regime had used tanks against 
its own ciƟ zens, and the whole thing, including images of kill-
ing, was televised. Western governments reacted with out-
rage, and Canada was one of the strongest criƟ cs. Joe Clark, 
the Foreign Minister, announced that Canada would suspend 
high-level visits, freeze or cancel some CIDA projects, re-eval-
uate Canadian support for celebratory visits, assist Chinese 
students stranded in Canada, and suspend parƟ cipaƟ on in the 
Three Gorges Project. The Chinese government did not apolo-
gize for its acƟ ons and told Canada that this was an internal 
maƩ er. 
 I recall wriƟ ng at the Ɵ me that our “special relaƟ on-
ship” was over. The tanks had done that. We thought China 
was something else than it turned out to be. The leaders had 
defi ed the zeitgeist of the Ɵ mes, which was the collapse of au-
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thoritarian rule in the communist world. We had hoped China 
was about to democraƟ ze, but this was a Western dream that 
ignored the realiƟ es of governing China. Tiananmen redrew 
the map of Canada-PRC relaƟ ons, providing a dose of real-
ity that was disturbing to many Canadians. We learned in the 
aŌ ermath of June 4 that we had no infl uence over China’s 
leaders. RelaƟ ons at the highest level—carefully nurtured 
for 20 years—proved to be broken reeds. There would be no 
dialogue on Tiananmen. June 4 also expanded the Canadian 
China policy community from a small elite of bureaucrats, aca-
demics, and poliƟ cians into a much larger network that now 
also included media, human rights advocates, and members of 
Canada’s Chinese communiƟ es, ready to criƟ cize China repeat-
edly for what it had done and what it would be doing in the 
future.
 The post-Tiananmen focus was on human rights abus-
es, and this would aff ect the relaƟ onship well into the 1990s, 
unƟ l Prime Minister ChreƟ en and the Liberals returned to 
power and made trade once again the primary offi  cial objec-
Ɵ ve in the relaƟ onship. The Team Canada visit in 1994 was an 
extraordinary event bringing to China over 400 Canadian busi-
ness representaƟ ves, the Prime Minister, two senior federal 
ministers, nine provincial premiers, and the northern territo-
rial leaders. 1700 Canadians and Chinese aƩ ended a mam-
moth banquet in the Great Hall of the People. They signed 
contracts and memoranda of understanding in the amount of 
CDN$8.5 billion, including a commitment to the sale of two 
CANDU nuclear reactors. The dollar amount of the deals made 
or commiƩ ed was almost 50 per cent greater than the enƟ re 
two-way trade between the two countries in 1994. It was the 
most producƟ ve trade mission in Canada’s history and up to 
then the largest foreign trade mission ever hosted by China.
 The Team Canada concept was not universally ap-
plauded by Canadians. The Globe and Mail wrote that Canada, 
“Managed to excuse the Chinese government’s unfortunate 
habit of torturing and murdering dissidents to underwrite 
its nuclear ambiƟ ons with two new CANDU reactors and to 
implicate this country in a colossal environmental disaster in 
the making, the Three Gorges Dam.” ChreƟ en, under aƩ ack 
for promoƟ ng trade while neglecƟ ng human rights, reminded 
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his criƟ cs, “Be realisƟ c. I’m the Prime Minister of a country of 
28 million people. [China has] 1.2 billion people. I’m not sup-
posed to tell the premier of Saskatchewan what to do. Am I 
supposed to tell the President of China what to do?”
 In the post-Tiananmen period we repaired the bilateral 
relaƟ onship, restoring high-level visits, the CIDA programmes, 
and other offi  cial contacts. The fl ow of people between the 
two countries rose substanƟ ally, in good part due to a spike 
in immigraƟ on to Canada from Chinese living in Hong Kong 
worried about the impending retrocession of Hong Kong in 
1997. China had recovered its poise. Deng Xiaoping in 1992 
reinforced China’s commitment to market reform, and the 
PRC conƟ nued along its course of rapid double-digit economic 
growth. A more realisƟ c appraisal of China would now have to 
include not just acceptance of its existence as an authoritarian 
state that brooked no foreign criƟ cism, but also as an econom-
ic force to be reckoned with in the emerging post-communist 
“new” world order.
 In 1996 the two countries established the Canada-Chi-
na Human Rights Dialogue, an annual meeƟ ng of top govern-
ment representaƟ ves from both sides to discuss human rights 
issues. For the next nine years these meeƟ ngs conƟ nued unƟ l 
they were suspended in 2005. At the outset the Dialogue was 
seen as a promising vehicle to engage China on a controver-
sial topic, but it degenerated into a sterile exchange. Other 
Western countries were trying the same approach and were 
similarly disappointed, for example, the Americans, who sub-
sequently also suspended their dialogue.
 When ChreƟ en leŌ  offi  ce in 2003, on the surface the 
restored relaƟ onship seemed solid once again. Yet the post-
Tiananmen period had not resolved the human rights agenda, 
and a part of the basic bilateral fabric was fraying. Despite 
our eff orts to increase trade, we had fallen further behind our 
compeƟ tors. In the 1970s we once ranked as No. 4 of China’s 
trade partners. Now we were a fading No. 14. We were run-
ning a 5 to 1 defi cit in our trade balance, whereas as late as 
1990 we sƟ ll had a surplus. Chinese trade protecƟ onism, 
dumping, and intellectual property rights violaƟ ons remained 
signifi cant obstacles. 
 More and more it appeared we were becoming “a 
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hewer of wood and a drawer of water” for China’s burgeoning 
economy. The CIDA programme was delivering high-quality 
development assistance to China, but China’s per capita GDP 
was reaching the point where it shortly could no longer qualify 
for CIDA funding. Consular maƩ ers needed aƩ enƟ on. China 
refused to recognize dual ciƟ zenship, and we needed China’s 
help in prevenƟ ng Chinese from seeking refuge in Canada to 
avoid criminal prosecuƟ on in China.
 Back in the 1970s and 1980s, Canada had helped China 
gain entry in internaƟ onal insƟ tuƟ ons, ending its poliƟ cal and 
economic isolaƟ on. AŌ er Tiananmen we realized that our 
presumed infl uence over China’s leaders had been exagger-
ated. At the turn of the millennium it was apparent that China 
had become a world power, and Canada was no longer one 
of China’s favoured partners. The balance had shiŌ ed, and we 
needed to rethink the relaƟ onship, even as Canada was begin-
ning to lose its place as a major player in world aff airs. 
 Now Ɵ ghtly Ɵ ed to a conƟ nental economic and poliƟ cal 
agenda, we had become an American follower for the beƩ er 
part of our foreign aff airs. Canada-China policy was basically 
walking in the footsteps of American-China policy. We no lon-
ger were trying to be in advance of the Americans or seeking 
to show our independence from them. Once the American and 
Chinese had “normalized” their relaƟ ons in the late 1970s our 
“China advantage” had essenƟ ally ended. For the future, Sino-
American relaƟ ons would serve as a benchmark for Western 
China policy. Consciously and unconsciously, we took our cues 
from that relaƟ onship because it is America that most mat-
tered to the Chinese. AŌ er the collapse of the Soviet Union 
that would become the defi ning relaƟ onship in internaƟ onal 
aff airs. 
 When Prime Minister Harper took offi  ce in 2005, 
the offi  cial China relaƟ onship fell on hard Ɵ mes. Harper, for 
ideological and domesƟ c poliƟ cal reasons, had no interest in 
conducƟ ng “normal” relaƟ ons with China along the lines of his 
predecessors, both Liberal and ConservaƟ ve. His main focus 
was human rights, and he pursued this with a vengeance, 
bestowing honourary ciƟ zenship on the Dalai Lama, criƟ ciz-
ing Chinese treatment of minority groups, and announcing to 
those in the business community who complained, that the 
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projecƟ on of Canadian values was “more important than the 
pursuit of the Almighty Dollar.” High-level visits ceased and of-
fi cial relaƟ ons froze in place. The bilateral relaƟ onship, already 
in need of repair, was allowed further to deteriorate. 
 In eff ect, we were offi  cially ignoring, if not demonizing 
China. At the people-to-people level the links conƟ nued, but 
those of us working in those areas felt we were squandering 
the huge investment we had made in China over 40 years, that 
surely there were beƩ er ways to “project Canadian values” 
and maintain appropriate relaƟ ons with one of the world’s 
future great powers. 
 UlƟ mately, high-level visits slowly resumed, public 
government aƩ acks on China’s human rights pracƟ ces disap-
peared, and in December 2010 the Prime Minister made an 
obligatory visit to China where the two sides agreed to move 
forward. Some of us who have been involved with China are 
scepƟ cal whether we can overcome the damage that has been 
caused to the relaƟ onship. To be sure, when we have had 
success with China it has been our Prime Ministers—Trudeau, 
Mulroney, and ChreƟ en—who have taken the lead, but it is 
unlikely that this will happen today. Harper does not appear 
to be interested in China, and this writer cannot visualize him 
as someone who intends to be the architect of a revitalized 
China relaƟ onship. It will be up to the rest of us to step up and 
conƟ nue what we began so courageously 40 years ago.
 To conclude this talk, I need fi rst to apologize for trying 
to cover so much ground in one lecture. Perhaps I lingered too 
long over the foreplay and did not pay enough aƩ enƟ on to the 
consummaƟ on of the relaƟ onship aŌ er 1970. I felt, however, 
if we wanted to understand what happened aŌ er 1970 that it 
was important to recall precisely how and why we wanted to 
establish relaƟ ons in the fi rst place. In the recent period, as 
we are re-examining our China policy, it can only be helpful to 
have a clearer portrait of how we got there. I hope that this 
talk has done that. 
 In my view, the construcƟ on of the bilateral relaƟ on-
ship has been an impressive achievement. In the early years 
we were in uncharted territory waiƟ ng for China to emerge 
from its ideological shell. We were pioneers in developing new 
programmes to open up China and make the most of Canada’s 
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limited resources for foreign relaƟ ons. The CIDA programme 
which we began in the early 1980s was an important innova-
Ɵ on, not just for training Chinese, but also for its “soŌ ” human 
rights programmes exposing Party offi  cials, legislators, judges 
and lawyers to Western democraƟ c pracƟ ces. The decision to 
establish a Sinologist posiƟ on, recruited from the community 
of Canadian China scholars and posted in Beijing, was a unique 
experiment. Thirteen of us served in the Embassy between 
1973 and 2001, and several may be here today in this room. 
 The family reunifi caƟ on programme established in 
1973 brought large numbers of Chinese to Canada in the fol-
lowing years to reunite with their families. It was the fi rst of 
its kind with a Western country. We were also among the fi rst 
Western countries to off er permanent resident status to Chi-
nese students stranded abroad aŌ er Tiananmen. Our Scholarly 
Exchange Programme, among the very fi rst, recently celebrat-
ed its 37th year of operaƟ on and has trained some of our top 
diplomats and scholars on both sides. The Team Canada visit in 
its Ɵ me was an innovaƟ ve aƩ empt to open up trade and was 
later copied by other countries. In the mid-1980s we resolved 
a signifi cant part of our Taiwan problem by seƫ  ng up an arm’s 
length NGO in Taipei administered by the Canadian Chamber 
of Commerce to represent our growing economic and cultural 
links with Taiwan. 
 Could we have done beƩ er? In hindsight it is always 
easy to off er criƟ cism. We did meet our goals of helping to 
bring China into the world community. Our two-way trade 
with China has increased 25 Ɵ mes since 1970, and our people-
to-people links are strong, especially with 1.2 million Canadi-
ans of Chinese origin now living in Canada. As I noted above, 
however, we are lagging behind in the China game, losing out 
to other countries in expansion of trade. In the human rights 
area, we have stumbled and are now trying to fi nd our way. 
We are no longer as important to China as we once were or 
thought we were, and we need to accept the reality of dealing 
with China as a major authoritarian world power in the longer 
term. What new challenges and opportuniƟ es will await us 
then in the next 40 years?
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EDUCATION AND CULTURE IN CANADA-CHINA RELATIONS: A 
RETROSPECTIVE IN RESPONSE TO B. MICHAEL FROLIC
— By Professor Ruth Hayhoe
It was my honor to make some comments on Bernie Frolic’s 
magisterial overview of 40 years of diploma? c rela? ons 
between China and Canada presented at the York Centre for 
Asian Research on September 21, 2010. I was deeply im-
pressed by his memories of the view from Moscow in 1965, 
his personal observaƟ ons of Trudeau’s approach to China, his 
refl ecƟ ons on the role of Canadian “missionary kids” in build-
ing the relaƟ onship, and also the importance of the Norman 
Bethune legacy. The discussion of the signifi cance of the Cana-
dian decision to sell wheat to China at the Ɵ me of famine was 
also very percepƟ ve, reminding us of how courageous a poliƟ -
cal decision it was at the Ɵ me. My own memory of that period 
was of being cruelly taunted by American cousins in Michigan, 
when I was visiƟ ng an aunt there, because “Canada was selling 
wheat to red China.” I had barely heard of China and had no 
idea why it was “red”, but my American cousins had clearly 
been well educated on the topic in their schools!
 In these brief remarks, which are presented in 
response to Bernie’s lecture, I focus on educaƟ on, and par-
Ɵ cularly the educaƟ onal events and iniƟ aƟ ves I have been 
involved in while serving as cultural aƩ aché in the Canadian 
embassy from 1989 to 1991, and subsequently in two ma-
jor projects of collaboraƟ on between Canadian and Chinese 
universiƟ es, that ran from 1989 to 2001. The overarching 
quesƟ on that frames my memories is one that also inspired a 
course on internaƟ onal academic relaƟ ons that I am sƟ ll teach-
ing: Can universiƟ es be actors on the global stage irrespecƟ ve 
of the poliƟ cal relaƟ onships between their countries?
 Let me begin with some memories of two diffi  cult 
years in Beijing, from July of 1989 to August of 1991. In De-
cember of 1988, I was iniƟ ally approached by Canada’s Depart-
ment of Foreign Aff airs and InternaƟ onal Trade, on Bernie’s 
recommendaƟ on, to see if I would consider taking up the 
Sinologist post in the Canadian Embassy in Beijing, a posiƟ on 
he had pioneered in the early 1970s. My appointment was 
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confi rmed in February of 1989, and I had the opportunity 
of doing research in Beijing and the North China region in 
April-May of that year under the sponsorship of the Canadian 
InternaƟ onal Development Agency (CIDA). In the early days of 
the student movement, it was exciƟ ng to be living at People’s 
University, visiƟ ng Tiananmen Square and even parƟ cipaƟ ng in 
a march of students and faculty at Inner Mongolia University 
in Hohhot, with the university vice-president also taking part. 
Those were the heady days before marƟ al law was imposed in 
mid-May of that year. My return to Canada on May 28 meant 
that I missed the tragic denouement of the movement, only 
seeing it on television at home in Toronto. My orientaƟ on to 
the Embassy post in June was taken up with rescue eff orts to 
ensure we got all Canadian students home from China. When 
I returned to China in late July to take up the diplomaƟ c ap-
pointment, Beijing was somber and subdued, enƟ rely diff erent 
from the city I had experienced in April and May. 
 What many Canadians may not be aware of was that 
the Canadian government took a rather diff erent approach 
than that of France, the United States, and other major Euro-
pean countries to their cultural relaƟ ons with China over the 
diffi  cult period that ensued. The French celebrated the heroes 
of Tiananmen with a parade of empty bicycles at their 200th 
anniversary of the French RevoluƟ on, puƫ  ng all cultural coop-
eraƟ on with Beijing on hold as an expression of offi  cial protest. 
The Americans had no choice but to cancel programs such as 
Fulbright and the Peace Corps due to the sensiƟ vity over the 
presence of such American media magnates as Dan Rather on 
Tiananmen Square at the height of the movement and over 
what Chinese authoriƟ es saw as the strong infl uence of the 
VOA (Voice of America) on protesƟ ng students. By contrast, 
the Canadian government decided to support and enhance 
cultural relaƟ ons with China at a Ɵ me when poliƟ cal and eco-
nomic relaƟ ons had nearly come to a standsƟ ll. Their posiƟ on 
was that students, scholars, arƟ sts, and media personnel had 
suff ered most from what had happened. Rather than punish 
them with isolaƟ on, we should keep our exchange programs 
acƟ ve and extend them further, if possible. Thus, the Canadian 
Studies programme, off ering fi ve-week study tours to Canada 
for cultural and educaƟ onal personnel, raised the number 
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of openings to 55 in the fi rst year I was in Beijing, up from 
around 30 in the year before, while the Canada-China scholars 
exchange programme conƟ nued to off er 12 one-year study op-
portuniƟ es. We were mandated to develop “people-to-people 
relaƟ ons,” and this was an extraordinary challenge in a country 
like China with a highly developed culture of offi  cialdom!
 I thought about it intensely as I made my way through 
the somber streets of Beijing that summer of 1989, and it soon 
became clear that the best way to handle this was to get out 
of Beijing and visit universiƟ es, provincial television and radio 
staƟ ons, and other cultural organizaƟ ons around the country. 
Given that there was a complete halt in high-level visits from 
Canada to China—not a single cabinet minister or provincial 
premier visited in the two years of my tenure—the small em-
bassy team was free from many of the usual diplomaƟ c duƟ es 
in Beijing, and it was possible to travel. I visited universiƟ es in 
all regions of the country, oŌ en taking along one or two local 
staff , holding recepƟ ons to get to know scholars interested 
in Canadian Studies, and increasing the number of Canadian 
Studies centres from about 12 to 21 over the two-year period. 
Large numbers of Canadian books were donated, small grants 
were given for projects of research or teaching related to 
Canada, and informaƟ on was provided about short and longer 
term programmes for study in Canada. In addiƟ on to these 
visits to universiƟ es, we oŌ en made contact with provincial 
television and radio staƟ ons and helped to plan two Canadian 
television weeks. We also held small-scale fi lm events with ar-
rangements to show selected Canadian fi lms. 
 Most important of all, these trips gave us opportuni-
Ɵ es to meet and talk with Chinese scholars, writers, arƟ sts, 
and fi lm makers in all regions of the country and get a sense of 
how they were experiencing the post-Tiananmen crackdown. 
When a moment for quiet conversaƟ on in a confi denƟ al envi-
ronment arose, I would someƟ mes ask how they felt about the 
policies of various Western governments towards China. The 
response was interesƟ ng and somehow typically Chinese:
 We are glad that governments such as France have
  taken such a principled stance in suspending their 
 cultural programmes as an expression of protest 
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 against the Chinese government. Yet at the same Ɵ me 
 we are thankful Canada has taken the opposite 
 approach and Canadian programmes and opportuniƟ es 
 give us hope for the future, keeping us from the kinds 
 of total isolaƟ on from the outside world that we 
 suff ered during the Cultural RevoluƟ on.
 It was a soul searching and diffi  cult Ɵ me, but it was a 
Ɵ me when I experienced in a very personal way the possibili-
Ɵ es and warmth of interacƟ on on a cultural and intellectual 
level during condiƟ ons of a near freeze in poliƟ cal relaƟ ons. 
Canadians can be proud of all the people-to-people interac-
Ɵ ons that took place over those two years and the ways in 
which these sustained hope in a period when many despaired. 
Only aŌ er Deng Xiaoping made his celebrated Southern tour 
early in 1992 did it become evident that the door would soon 
open again and relaƟ ons with the Western world gradually 
return to normal.1
 A second aspect of the educaƟ onal relaƟ ons between 
China and Canada had begun aŌ er Canada and China signed 
their fi rst development cooperaƟ on agreement. From the 
beginning, there was a strong interest on the Chinese side for 
assistance in educaƟ on, aŌ er the devastaƟ ng eff ects of the 
Cultural RevoluƟ on, and especially in higher educaƟ on. When 
a World Bank delegaƟ on had visited Shanghai in 1981 while 
I was working as a foreign expert at Fudan University, it was 
interesƟ ng to learn how they had off ered loans for agricultural 
or industrial development, only to fi nd that fi rst on the Chi-
nese priority list for loans was educaƟ on. World Bank repre-
sentaƟ ves responded that they might consider loans for basic 
educaƟ on, and the Chinese replied that they needed loans for 
higher educaƟ on, something the World Bank was doing very 
liƩ le of at that period of Ɵ me. However, such was their eager-
ness to get China involved aŌ er its decades of isolaƟ on that 
a series of higher educaƟ on loans was agreed upon. By the 
late 1980s, 188 universiƟ es in diff erent regions of China had 
benefi ted from loans amounƟ ng to over U.S. $1.1 billion, and 
covering the areas of basic sciences, agriculture, medicine, 
management, vocaƟ onal educaƟ on, and teacher training.2
 As far as I know, Canada was the only Western country 
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that responded in a similar way to the World Bank and off ered 
support to Chinese universiƟ es through a series of university 
linkage projects that emerged as part of Canada’s overseas 
development programme soon aŌ er the signing of the agree-
ment in 1983.3 UniversiƟ es were seen as having much to 
contribute to the array of development projects launched by 
CIDA, whose operaƟ ons in China were divided into six sectors: 
human resource development, agriculture, forestry, energy, 
transportaƟ on, and communicaƟ ons. The Canada-China Man-
agement EducaƟ on Program (CCMEP, 1983-1990, 1991-1996), 
and the Canada-China University Linkage Program (CCULP, 
1988-1995) were included within CIDA’s human resource de-
velopment sector. CCMEP linked 17 Canadian universiƟ es with 
eight Chinese Management/Business Schools, while CCULP 
paired 31 Canadian universiƟ es with Chinese counterparts in 
areas such as health, agriculture, educaƟ on, and engineering. 
CCULP’s purpose was to develop the insƟ tuƟ onal capacity of 
the parƟ cipaƟ ng Chinese universiƟ es so that they could beƩ er 
contribute to China’s naƟ onal and social development.4  Build-
ing on the successes and strengths of CCULP, the Canada-China 
Special University Linkage ConsolidaƟ on Program (SULCP, 
1996-2001) selected 11 projects out of the original 31 under 
CCULP and supported them for a second phase that reached 
out to involve 25 Canadian universiƟ es and more than 200 Chi-
nese universiƟ es, teaching hospitals, schools, and governmen-
tal and non-governmental agencies. SULCP projects furthered 
China’s eff orts to improve health, basic educaƟ on, agriculture, 
manufacturing, poverty reducƟ on, and environmental pro-
tecƟ on.5  AddiƟ onally, there were signifi cant projects in the 
community college sector of higher educaƟ on. It has been esƟ -
mated that about CDN$ 250 million were expended in these 
and related acƟ viƟ es, nearly one quarter of the World Bank 
loans to Chinese higher educaƟ on over the same period.6
 The combined span of CCMEP, CCULP and SULCP 
(1983-2001) coincided with a period of pivotal change in Chi-
nese society. These university-based programmes, encompass-
ing disciplines ranging from health to educaƟ on, environment, 
management, minority area development, engineering, and 
agriculture, enabled Chinese universiƟ es to improve their ca-
pacity to respond to China’s development needs. The projects 
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also had a signifi cant impact on insƟ tuƟ onal development for 
the parƟ cipaƟ ng universiƟ es. The partnership modality cre-
ated a large plaƞ orm for Chinese universiƟ es to adapt Cana-
dian models and approaches to the Chinese context, and draw 
upon leading areas of experƟ se in Canada that were valuable 
for China’s development needs. These large-scale university 
partnerships also substanƟ ally raised the internaƟ onal status 
of Canadian universiƟ es and gave them the opportunity for 
signifi cant experience in internaƟ onal development work and 
an enhanced awareness of the rapid pace of globalizaƟ on, 
parƟ cularly in East Asia. 
 Canadians have tended to be low-key in their inter-
naƟ onal development iniƟ aƟ ves, and probably few people 
realise how many rich interacƟ ons occurred during these years 
of intensive cooperaƟ on in educaƟ on and research between 
Chinese and Canadian universiƟ es. Nor has much eff ort been 
made to keep records of all the acƟ viƟ es in graduate educa-
Ɵ on, research and various forms of training over these years, 
given that Canada has no federal agency responsible for 
higher educaƟ on, and CIDA has moved on to other regions 
and sectors in its development assistance. Nevertheless, I am 
convinced that this was a period of signifi cant mutual learning 
among universiƟ es, scholars and students in the two countries. 
I know from my personal experience in overseeing two major 
projects of joint doctoral educaƟ on and research, how many 
people have been enriched and have conƟ nued and extended 
their internaƟ onal collaboraƟ ve network as a result. Among 
those who parƟ cipated in our joint doctoral project, there 
are now two vice presidents, four deans of educaƟ on and 
more than ten senior scholars serving in universiƟ es in various 
regions of China, as well as Canadian scholars who conƟ nue 
to be involved in projects such as schools for language immer-
sion, research on higher educaƟ on massifi caƟ on, and cross-
cultural studies of feminist acƟ vism.
 Many of these university linkage projects were 
launched shortly before the Tiananmen tragedy, and the fact 
that they remained acƟ ve during the two years of poliƟ cal 
freeze remains a testament to the possibiliƟ es of educaƟ onal 
and cultural diplomacy and the autonomy universiƟ es are able 
to exercise beyond their naƟ onal borders. 
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